Lack of effective Iranian ‘soft power’ could cost its regional influence dearly

On August 1, the daily al-Akhbar published an article with a revealing title, evoking “the Sadr-Maliki bomb”. A choice of words which, for a publication considered close to Hezbollah, betrays at least some concern about the risk of armed confrontation to come between the two major Iraqi Shiite poles, led respectively by Moqtada al-Sadr and pro-Shiite personalities. -Tehran, including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

In another article from the same periodical, journalist Hussein Ibrahim points out that any conflict between these Shiite groups would open the door to many developments in Iraq – and in particular a strengthening of the “separatist situation” in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would lead to a “normalization with Israel”, as well as greater intervention by Turkey and the Gulf countries in the country through “local agents”. Reading between the lines, we can deduce that, from the author’s point of view, such an inter-Shiite conflict would lead to a weakening of Iranian interests in Iraq, to ​​the benefit of the antagonistic regional powers.

Backfire

However, the Sadr-Maliki stalemate, which began after the parliamentary elections last October, is partly the result of Iran’s actions in the country and in particular of the fear of pro-Iranian groups of being excluded from the future government. Iraqi. Admittedly, this situation arguably cannot be blamed solely on Iran, given the personal rivalries at play and the fact that Sadr, the main opponent of pro-Iranian groups, has a long and complex relationship with Tehran. But the reality is that Iran’s interests would not be served if its staunchest Iraqi allies were removed from a government that relies on the support of Kurds and Sunnis, communities whose regional agendas differ – even oppose – those of Iran.

Lebanon is central to Iran’s regional strategy, as it was there that Iranians first understood the gains that could be made in Arab societies divided along political-sectarian lines. After playing on Lebanese sectarian divisions to slowly transfer power to the Shia community from the 1980s, Tehran extended this approach, with some variations, to other plural societies such as Iraq, Yemen and Syria. And even in the absence of tribal or sectarian divisions, as in the Palestinian territories, the Islamic Republic has exploited divisions between local factions to create profitable opportunities.

Yet this Iranian capability has led to a paradox. In Arab states where Iran has made progress, it has done so by taking advantage of domestic discord and violence. To be affiliated with Iran usually means to be brought to one’s knees: in places where Iranians have had influence, their allies have carved out a path of destruction and poverty for their societies. If allying with Iran entails such suffering, can Tehran’s neo-imperial regional project ever become sustainable? Iran’s security and intelligence apparatuses, and their local allies in Arab countries, can of course bully to retain power, but at some point that only creates greater resentment, leading to what can ultimately be a harsh backlash.

The history and evolution of the Syrian presence in Lebanon provide an interesting parallel in this respect: for 29 years, Syrian hegemony seemed unassailable, until suddenly, in February 2005, it was no longer. Since the Syrian military withdrawal in April of that year, Damascus’ local allies saw their power steadily eroded, until the Syrian uprising accelerated this trend. No one looks back on the Syrian years with nostalgia, because most Lebanese know that what Damascus helped set up and defend was a long interregnum of widespread corruption, brutality, destruction of Lebanon’s constitutional heritage and submission to Syrian priorities. Come to think of it, that looks pretty much like what Iran is offering Lebanon today.

Michael Young

Limited return

Iran does not seem particularly good at “soft power”, which is generally defined as the ability to influence others without resorting to coercion. And yet, as countless commentators, including the creator of the concept, Joseph Nye Jr, have written, soft power can be extremely effective when it comes to enhancing the appeal of dominant nations. For historian Niall Ferguson, political and economic liberalism was an inherently positive aspect of the British Empire and allowed it to survive longer than it could have. American writer Charles Paul Freund has argued that American popular culture played an important role in weakening the Soviet Union. French educational institutions, in turn, continued to play a vital role in its former colonies and mandates, helping to maintain French influence in those countries long after their direct control had ended.

It is therefore surprising that a country with such a rich history and culture as Iran has instead chosen to propose as a message to the world an austere ideology, based in particular on perpetual armed militancy and an Islamic revolution, which has often drifted towards Shiite sectarianism, as during the Syrian conflict. In Lebanon, for example, Iran’s main backer, Hassan Nasrallah, has repeatedly expressed his vision of a country that would effectively become a “garrison state”, in which Hezbollah would play a vanguard role in defense against threats from Israel, the United States and other potential enemies of the so-called “axis of resistance”. While many Lebanese share Hezbollah’s hostility to Israel, they don’t necessarily want to be on the front line in this battle, nor do they want to sever their ties with the West.

In other words, in terms of attractiveness, the Iranian message offers a limited return: to engage in a destructive war with Israel in the name of Iran is hardly an option capable of arousing the enthusiasm of the Arab masses, whether in Lebanon, Gaza or Syria. More alarmingly, in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s stranglehold on the state is beginning to prompt some of the party’s opponents to consider partitioning the country, on the assumption that if you can’t defeat Hezbollah, you can at least separate from it. Similar backlash against Iran exists in Iraq, where Shiites protesting their government’s policies have been targeted by pro-Iranian militias on several occasions.

Failing to want to strengthen its power of ideological attraction, what is Iran’s ultimate goal in the Middle East? If it is a question of creating a zone of influence which would allow it to affirm its regional importance, is this possible in the Arab countries where many people, in certain cases majorities, consider Iran as a source biggest problem?

It could be that the Iranians, at this point, are in a phase of expansion and have simply chosen to momentarily take advantage of opportunities that are detrimental to the societies in which they operate. In this light, they would only change their approach, trying to attract larger segments of Arab populations, once they had consolidated their authority. Such an approach may seem promising, but a theocratic regime that still lives on the memory of a revolution that took place nearly half a century ago is not best placed to guide this forward-looking effort, and it didn’t do it at home. Social and economic disintegration is gripping the Arab world, and most young people in the region seem interested only in improving their living conditions.

Unless Iran manages to develop its soft power, unless it moves towards a vision that addresses the real concerns of a new generation of Arabs, its hegemony over several Arab societies will remain both tenuous and unstable. But perhaps the Iranians already know this, because adapting to the desires of the region through a model that is more open, more attractive, less martial and that appeals to younger generations could ultimately threaten the regime in Tehran. . By trying to preserve itself, this regime could in fact lay the groundwork for the failure of its project in the Middle East.